How are these Iran talks different from all other talks?
and what the Trump Administration has to do not to blow it...
Yet once more talks are beginning on the Iran nuclear program-yet these talks are different from all other talks.
One difference is that Iran has more than proven that it can enrich to weapons-grade or close. It has the know-how and the technology and can move fast, so an elaborate technical set of constraints on enrichment isn’t realistic as the focus this time around. Another difference is that a split between hardliners-Khamenei & co.-and the reformists, headlined by President Masoud Pezeshkian, is more or less out in the open-the internal Iranian politics around the talks are manifest.
But what’s also new is the Trump negotiating style, worlds away from that of the Obama team.
So far:
-Trump has appointed his top negotiator, Steve Witkoff, to lead the talks. Witkoff reports directly to Trump himself. This creates credibility, limiting the capacity of bureaucrats to run interference in the negotiations, or to trip over one another.
-The E3 are nowhere to be seen-by not bringing them into the talks Trump has drastically reduced transaction costs. This includes the risk of leaks, misinformation, and backdoor influence of other actors.
-Trump has gone out of his way to indicate a deal is about bringing Iran in from the cold, as it were. A deal would signify the beginning of the end of US demonization of Iran. Neither Obama nor Biden had this broader vision of what a nuclear deal could mean-it was a narrow grudging effort to avoid having to contemplate military action.
-President Trump understands that states don’t make deals unless they can see benefits in concrete terms, like money. Witkoff, also from the real estate world, gets that too. The Biden team paid little attention to Iran’s concerns that it gain something real, even in the short term, from the commitments that were being demanded.
-Trump is by character impatient with arcane details, mind-boggling technicalities. In some sense, the previous attempt to revive the Iran nuclear deal died a long painful death by technocracy. It is all too easy, with the complicity of experts, for those trying to spike any deal to manufacture scientific or technical loose ends that remain to be tied up-and when some appear to be tied up, to come along with others. A solid deal will depend instead on the soundness of the basic bargain, and the possibility of trust, which needs to grow over time.
Where Trump and Witkoff risk not getting the most out of these advantages, is how they articulate the alternative to a deal. Obviously, in the absence of a deal, if Iran were to decide to weaponize and pursue that course to its end then a military option would be an obvious possibility. But presenting the current state of play as “deal or bomb” in fact risks some of Trump Administration’s leverage in the negotiations. Here’s how.
Iran’s leaders are well aware of the high costs to the US of operationalizing a military option, its limited prospects of success, the likely domestic opposition not only from the left but much of the conservative world as well, and the overall distaste of the Trump Administration for outright war against a major regional power.
Presenting near-term military action as the only alternative to a quick deal gives the hardliners, who may want to sabotage talks, some real ammunition. For them, Trump’s vision of a deal as a new path forward must surely be frightening. With a devastated economy, many pressures for change, and dismal results with its strategy of proxy wars, the traditionalist regime depends a lot on demonization by America to hold together such public support as exists. A deal, and the good vibes it brings (at least in Trump’s version of things), will lead to more pressures for change, and diminish a major source of the regime’s internal legitimacy, the mortal opposition to America.
On the other hand, a military confrontation between the US (and Israel) and Iran would cement national unity against the great enemy. Most of the rest of the world would side with Iran against the US. America would be weakened and burdened throughout the region. The likely failure of military action to do anything but result in a short setback of the nuclear program would heighten confidence in the hardliners’ version of the regime and accentuate a sense of Iran’s power in the region.
In these circumstances, it is best for the Trump Administration to leave open and uncertain its response if negotiations don’t work in the near term. This certainly doesn’t mean eliminating the option of bombing should Iran show clear unambiguous signals of moving toward weaponization. But it also might include the status quo, simply enforcing more strictly the existing “maximum pressure” measures. Finally, the Administration should ask itself: might we not be able to live for a period of time even with a nuclear-armed Iran? Don’t we have enough means of deterrence to neutralize any significant threat from Iran having a few nuclear bombs?
The most powerful incentive for Iran to pursue weaponization-an outcome that will for Iran create as many problems and opportunities both in terms of domestic and foreign politics (consider a possible Saudi response!)-is that defying the West shows somehow its strength and independence. The more scared we are of Iran ultimately getting a bomb, the more leverage Iran will have over us. Paradoxically, the fastest route to cutting Iran’s nuclear program down to size would be to learn to live with the possibility of weaponization.
This is not in any way to criticize the Trump Administration’s strategy for negotiations. To the contrary, I’d say: all on board! Rather the point is that the more viable alternatives to a deal we have up our sleeve, the stronger our hand in bargaining to “yes.”
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